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Abstract
Two protocols for access to electronic strongbox are described in the context of plectronic
commerce. The notion of electronic strongboxes is discussed. and the participants of
the strongbox system are presented. The t\VO protocols r.oncern two participants of the
strongbox system. namely the Customer who wishes to access a strongbox mailltained by
a Strongbox Provider. The security aspects of the protocols arc then analyspd. focusing
on possible methods of chc.'1ting hy the t.wo involved participants.
Keywords
Electronic Strongboxes, Electronic Commerce~ Information Security, :\etwork Security.

1. I~TRODUCTION

The development of user-friendly browsers for information deposits on the Internet, together with executable programs capable of running via these browsers, has attracted
unprecedented interest in the use of the Internet as the vehicle for electronic commerce.
The decrease in hardware costs and storage prices in the last few years has increased
the accessibility of personal computers to the ordinary person on the street. Currently
lThe author is also at the University of Western Sydney - Macarthur, NSW 2560, Australia.

Network Computers (NC) are speculated as being the next possible source for large consumption of PC-related technologies, bringing not only electronic commerce, but a whole
range of computerized activities over the Internet.
Currently, most research efforts have been focused on providing secure payment system
for customers. However, in the future, other services related to payment systems may
emerge. We perceive that one such service will be that of electronic strongbol·es (Hardjono
and Seberry, 1996) as part of the larger electronic commerce infrastructure.

As currently the Internet and other networks lack the means for customers to securely
store on-line the digital information corresponding to electronic cheques, coins or notes,
the concept of electronic strongboxes represents an attractive solution to the problem.
The technology to implement secure electronic strongboxes is partly available today. Many
of the required protocols can be derived from other proposed systems in electronic commerce, which 50 far has focused mainly on payment systems. These proposed systems range
from those which require an interface to the existing financial infrastruct llre (such as DigiCash (Chaum, 1985; Chaum, 1992), iKP (Bellare et al, 1995), NetBill (Sirbu and Tygar,
1995) and SET (Visa and MasterCard, 1996)), to those \'v"hich employ electronic coins/cash
as a reusable payment mechanism circulating electronically (eg. ~etCash/NetChequc
(Neuman and Medvinsky, 1995; Medvinsky and Neuman 1993)).

III this paper we develop further the work of IIardjono and Seberry (1996) by presenting
protocols for the submission and retrieval of a strongbox by a customer. The protocol
employs public key (asymmetric) cryptography, as well as private key (symmetric) cryptography to ensure the security of the strongbox transfer. The customer uses a pseudonym
(Chaum, 1981) when dealing with the provider of the strongbox service.
In the next section the background for electronic strongboxes i~ discussed. This is followed
by a description of a basic system for electronic strongboxes in Section 3. Access to the
strongboxes is discussed in Section 4, presenting the protocols for submission (check-in)
and retrieval (check-out). Some points regarding the protocols and their 5€curity are then
discussed in ·Section .5, with Section G ending the paper.

2. ELECTRONIC STRONGBOXES: BACKGROUND
The notion of electronic strongboxfs as the counterpart of physical strongboxes or safeboxes
was initially proposed in 1996 (Hardjono and Seberry, 1996). The concept was derived
from the similar notion found in the physical world. rn the traditional financial sector
the provision of strongboxes has been in service for sometime. Customers can apply to
have a private strongbox held within a bank, in which the customer can place any type

al:t.i ::. .:'Y amount of valuables, subject only to the physical characteristics of the strongbox.

:·;:J.k

Th.:
typically has no interest in the contents of the strongbox, anti tierives income
[ro= :.~oviding safe storage and access to such strongboxes. The identity of the strongbox
cu~:c~er and the fact itself of the customer having a strongbox are usually treated as
cor.~.':'-=:ltial by the bank.

In <-:-= :oncept of the electronic strongbox the customer would access his or her strongbox ::.;~:: the Internet nsing a suitable browser that provided a secure environment for
th-= '':''~~. Cscrs of a "strongbox-browser" would be allowed to manipulate objects stored
wit~::. :he strongbox using an iconic object representation. These electronic objects or
iteu:~ :2.11 be certiIied representations of physical objects, and can include electronic coins
or (~::.. electronic bank cheques, digital documents (eg. stocks and contracts), anony .
mo-.:..: ":':g:ital certificates of ownership of physical items, cryptographic material to acce~s
oti:.:::- ~-=:-\-ices. and others. A customer may have multiple strongboxes. each at diffP.fing
s(ro::g:0x providers. Joint ownership of a strongbox can serve as an exchange medium
be',-.'--=-=:: :ts two owners. Using a unified interface. customers sholdd bl! able to move items
ht'~'.\'-?7::' ~trollgboxes, each under different providers.
Til", -:;::-;:.:'iOll of strongboxes on a global net\vork such as the Intern!'! m;lY If:'ad t.() ;1Il
-=l~O;-,(' ::::: whir h is based not only OIl IIlonetary lransac tions. b \l t also on ba rl u. or re:~() 11;):
trace. _~.:: rhe exchange of items is a normal part of daily life, electronic strongboxes can llP
a r..e·":':-':::l within \vhich to carry-out non-monetary commerce with privacy. confidentiality
anc. '':~-=: J.llonymity. Other institutions may act as t·nlnf.r8 anu COT!re7'tcr.~ where legZll a:1(1
\'alJ.2.::'~"; :ternt: (eg. gold) are given a valuation and electronic certific(lt.e~ ;HP gOllCratf_'t.i fe!'
the :te::::,. Tht-' same institution may also provide long-term safe storag;~ for the rhy~ir;:j
iten:~. -.;:iil:3t the anonymous owm~r Ilses the elpc:t.rollic certificate on thE: Int~rnet. Pri\-arr:
pllrc:-.~.,;:: 0f legal items between users should he fa.cilitateu ::;ince such an C\'ent is COmn;,jll
ill 6e:-:: ":'ay life.
Pre\-:o'':''~

research on anonymous and verifiable databases have open conducteu by Brandt d
al ( 1033'. and also reported by others (Hardjono and Seberry, 199.)). Th,' (\ im in Brand t e t
al ~lg~~' was to allow certain institutions (eg. hospitals) to maintain data ahollt l)Puplc..'
leg. ;--.:::€nts) whilst maintaining anonymity through the use of pseudonyms for pr;v{\cy
rea'-:0r.~. F\'rsons having data in the databa.se cOllld verify that their information is COITI..'ct
and t ~:2.: ao illegal modifications had been made. This is significan tly different from the
l1oti\.1:: ~< electronic strongboxes. First, the items stored in the strongboxes carry reaJ
and g~Oj;l; vallle as .they are an electronic representation of physical goods. Secondly. the
elcctro:-j( items themselves can circulate within the system. moving from one strongbox
to ano:Je:-. Thirdly, such a movement of items should be untra.ceable, as the ownership
of an i~2:1;, is regarded as confidential information. Finally, althou?;h anonymity is equally
require·::' ~'-~ ill Brandt et al (1988) in electronic strongboxes it represents a more complex
proble:-..: ~1:3 it involves several parties - similar to electronic payment systems.
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Figure 1. An Electronic Strongbox System

3. STRONGBOX SYSTEMS: BASIC COMPONENTS
Fignre 1 illustrates a simple design for a strongbox systl:Irl, borrowing the terminology
from the area of electronic payment systems. All electronic interactions hetween participants are assumed to be over a secure channel, with peer authentication conducted at the
commencement of communications. The proposed system of Figure 1 does not pretend to
be comprehensive, and it attempts only to address the main components only. Additional
components will be required to support the framework to achieve full workability.
The participants of the system are as follows:

• Customer: the customer or user, interacting with the Strongbox Provider (eg_ Bank)
for the safekeeping of electronic items.
.
• Strongbox Provider: an institution that provides the electronic strongbox service
to a customer, accepting the storage and retrieval of electronic items to/from the
electronic strongboxes .
.; On-Line Valuer: the On-Line Valuer is trusted to verify that an electronic item

A

belonging to an owner (ie. Customer) truly exists and has not been modified by
its current owner. The Valuer can also be requested to split items into several subitems, and issue certificates for them. Several Valuers may exist on-line, and each
must recognize the other's certification. In general the On-Line Valuers carry-out
the tasks of the traditional Certification Authority (CA), and therefore they are
equally trusted.

• Physical Valuer: the Physical Valuer should be distinct from the On-Line Valuer as
the Physical Valuer knows what a physical item is and which pseudonym forwarded
the physical item to be valued. The Physical Valuer stores the physical items at the
Secure Physical Storage, to which the Association has access in the ca.se of disputes.
The Physical Va.lner is a highly trusted entity since it has direct access to t.ht> physical
goods.

• Exchange Facilitator: the Lxchange Facilitator aids two or more ClIstomers who
wish to exchange items from their strongboxes. The Exchange Facilitator is also a
trusted entity in the same way that arbiters are trusted in contract-signing protocols.
They obtain income from providing the exchange service and for acting as an arbiter.

• Association: the Strongbox Providers and the Valuer work under the umbrella of
the Association. Customers bring dispntes to the A:-isociatioll.
In addition, there is the Notary. The :';otary comes in on behalf of a Customer
disputes necessitates their presence.

\,hl:'ll

The Customer is the owner of the contents of a strongbox aIlli is deemed also as the owner
of the strongbox. The Customer must first join the strongbox system by opening an
account with the Strongbox Provider, which can be a Dank 01 other institlltions having
the necessary computer infrastructure to provide this service. The Customer ohtains
membership through the Associat.ion which issues the Customer \vith the credentials (eg.
\Y'ithin a smartcard) and with a pseudonym to be used within the system. The Customer
henceforth employs this pseudonym \'v'hen using the system.

4. SECURE ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC STRONGBOXES
In the physical world, strongboxes are typically held by the provirier of the service, snch as
a Bank. The Customer/owner of the strongbox request access to his or her strongbox to
the Bank. The Bank would then provide the Customer with the physical box in a secure
environment (such as a locked room or within a guarded vault). At no point does the
Bank see the contents of the Customer's strongbox. The Customer returns the box to the
Bank after he or she is finished with it.

Upon bringing this concept and scenario into the electronic realm, one notices similarities
in the basic interaction between the Customer and the Provider (ie. Bank). However,
II nlike the physical strongboxes, electronic strongboxes possess features that derive directly
from its electronic nature:
• Interaction between the Customer and the Provider is carried-out over the electronic
communications medium (eg. Internet), and no face-to-face contact occurs. Therefore, methods of authentication must underlie the whole interaction between the
Customer and the Provider.
• Customers may obtain stronger security and privacy compared to the physical strongboxes. In the case of physical strongboxes, the Bank may in fact illegally access the
strongbox using a copy of the user's key. In practice it is difficult to provide a
guarantee to the Customer that the Bank does not have a copy of the Customer's
physical key.
In contrast, in electronic strongboxes the Customer may simply encrypt all his or
her digital items before placing them in the strongboxes. Given a secure encryption
algorithm, the Bank may find it economically and computationally infeasible to
break the Customer's encipherment.
• Unlike the physical environment which may be made secure (eg. a vault), an equally
secure computing environment is difficult to achieve in the electronic \vorld. Although end-to-end security can be achieved through the use of encryption technology, the security of computations and the privacy of behaviours at the Customer's
end and at the Provider's end cannot so far be guaranteed.
It is towards this end that security contributions from technologies such as J a\'(l
(Dean et aI, 1996; Felten et ai, 19!)(j) and CORBA (OMG, 1991; OMG, 1994; Varadharajan and Hardjono, 1996) are sorely needed.
In the following we present two basic protocols corresponding to the retrieval (or cher.kout) and submission (check-in) of strongboxes. We assume that a Customer (denoted as
"Customer") is wishing to check-in/check-out a strongbox to/from n, Strongbox Pro\'ider
("Provider" for short). We leave the form of the electronic items unspecified, since the
items are enciphered by the Customer before entered into the stronghox, and therefore
bears little relevance to the Provider.
4.1. Notation

Both public key cryptography and private key cryptography are employed. The public-key
pairs are denoted as (f(,k), where J( is public and k is secret.
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The Customer holds the public-key pair (l{c, kc ). The Customer also own a private key
BI(c (ie. "Box Key") which is never revealed to anyone. This is used to encipher the digital
contents of his or her strongbox before submitting it to the Provider. That is. assuming
that the Customer owns the electronic items item1, item2,"" item n , the strongbox in its
most simple form would consist of the encipherment of these items as a unit Ilsing the
key BA- c ' More precisely, BOX;:: {index,iteml,·item2, ... ,itemn}BK~ where nox is
the Customer's strongbox. The Customer may choose to apply other functions - such
as compression of the items - before the encipherment. The Customer may also wish to
encipher each item separately, in which case an 'index (also enciphered) ma.)' be llsed to
keep track of items in the strongbox.
The Provider holds the public-key pair (/(p, k p ). The Provider will also generate a private
session-key Spc and Scpwhich is used to create a secure channel between the Provider and
the Customer

ne-

The operation "{h·" means that the contents within the braces "{}" arc enciphered or
ciphered using the key 1(. The meaning is the same in the case of public key encipherment
or private key encipherment.
The operation "[ h" denotes a signature using the private-key ti:, verifiable using its matching public-key I(. The string being signed is assumed to accompany the signaturf-;. Hence
"[Xh" really means the couple (X, signature), which implies that all parties can see X
and verify the signature. H is a secure one-way hash function, while I'v' i represent nonces.
All Customer employs the pseudonym PI D when dealing \vith the Provider. The Pro\'iJ('r
is assumed to be trllsted not to reveal the fact of the Customer having a strongbox. as is
the custom with providers of physical strongboxp.s.

4.2. Strongbox Check-In
CI-l. Customer CI-2. Provider CI-3. Customer -

Provider: {ChecklnRequest,PIDc.Nlh· p
Customer: {Spc, N l , N 2

h·c

Provider: {BOX, tstampc' [H(BOXlltstampJk .. N l , S2}"
-

_1':'"

Here BOX;:: {index,iteml,ilem2, ... ,itemn}BI\c where index is simply a list of
items in the strongbox. The eustomer keeps a copy of BO X in secure memory until
the protocol is completed. At the end of a successful check-ill, the Customer can
discard the memory-copy of EO X. The key B ro; c is a private key known only to the
Customer.
Upon receiving the strongbox, the Provider re-calculates II(BOXlitstampJ using
BOX and tstamPcthat it had just received, and compares the result against that

signed by the ClIstomer. This is to ensure that the Customer is honest and does not
substitute the true EO)( for a bog1ls one.
The Provider then securely stores both the strongbox BOX and the value t~lampc
denoting the check-in time.

CI-4. Provider -

Customer: {Acknowledge, [H( BOX\\t.slampJJk

p

,Nd :;'I'C
.

Here the Provider signs a hash of the flO X and tstampc and returns it to the
Customer as a receipt. The Customer can check that the hash value is indeed the
same as that previously computed by the Customer. The value t8tmnp,; is that
received from the Customer ill Step CI-3.
The Customer keeps a copy of the signed [H(BOXlitstampJh p until the next time
the Customer checks-in the strongbox. This allows the Customer to verify that no
tampering occurred on the BOX whilst it was in the possession of the Provider.
In this manner, both the Customer and the Provider has a signed hash of the BO}..'
from each other as proof should any disputes occllr at a later time.

4.3. Strongbox Check-Out
CO-I. ClIstomer -

Provider: {CheckOutRequest,PIDc.N-:d!\·p

CO-2. Provider -'- Customer: {Scp, t.slamp p, [H(BO Xllt.stfLmp.: )hl" :V3,.\'4} [\'<
The Provider retrieves the pair (flOX,tstampc) from its secure storage, when~ nox
is the strongbm: and tstamp.: is the timestamp \'alue from the previous check·in e\·ent.
The Pro\'ider gives the Customer a signed hash of the st.rongbox BOX, against
which the U!:ier can compare hash values. Notc that t.he lIser still has a copy of
[JIlflOXiitstl17npJL.: p obtained [rom the check-in event.
The Provider also accompanies the message with the new timestamp tSlelHlP p which
the Customer can verify as being close enough to the current clock time.

As proof for the Provider, the Customer attaches the current timestamp lstamp p
to the signed-hash value [H(BOX\\tstampJh p received from the Provider. ~ext,
the Customer :signs the resulting concatenation and sends the result back to the
Provider. In this way the Provider has some proof that the Customer has checkeclout the strongbox at some time tstamp p •

8

CO-4. Provider ~ Customer: {EO X, N.j, Ns} Scp
Upon receiving the proof from the Customer, the Proviner proceeds to deliver the
BOX to the Customer via the secure channel established using the symmetric key
Scpo

CO-5. Customer

~ Provider:

{[Acknou.,i€dgeh c , Ns} '-'cp
~

The Customer then sends a signed acknowledgment message to the Provider. indicating the completion of the protocol.

5. DISCUSSION
One noticeable aspt:ct of the two protocols for strongbox access is the unequal distrihlltloIl
of the burden of providing proofs (receipt.s). \l()re specifically in the case of the Check-Ollt
protocol, the Provider expects the Customer to give a receipt in <t<ivance (Step CO·3) to
the Provider. Only after receiving the receipt does the Prm'ider delivpr the stroIl):!,box to
the Customer (Step CO-·I).
vVe accept this imbalance by pointing to the fact that access to a stronghox is 110t ld(~jltical
to contract-signing. The strongbox Pro\Oider must be accorded some level of t.rllst by t!tp
C tlstomer, simi I'll' to the si t ua lioIl in the phy~ical world. In any case. the strongbox
contents are assumed to be spcureiy enciphered
the Customer, and therefore they
cannot be accessed by the Provider. Furthermore, the Provider gains l10thiIlg by dellying
access.

oy

Two possible scenanos with respect to cheating
follows:

In

the checking· in of

stron~b0x

are as

• The Customer riF.nifS chf.d:ing-in 'hI' stmllgbl).r. The Customer, therefore. claims
that the strongbox is still checked-out.
This form of cheating is self-defeatiIl~ to the Customer, as onl.\" the Customer call
make use of the contents of the strongbux.
One possible motive for such a denial is where the Customer wishes to check-in the
same strongbox at different Providers. This is equivalent to the Customer (illegally)
duplicating items and storing these cu'pies at the different Providers. This method
of cheating cannot be detected with these protocols, bllt would be detected either
when the Customer converts the electronic items back to physical items, or when an
item is exchanged via the Exchange facilitator and On-Line Valuer 2.
2Note that the issue of duplicate items circulating is not directly rela.ted to the access to strongboxes, but
rather to the method of representing electronic items in the system (Hardjono and Seberry. 19%).

• The Provider denies thai the ClLstomer has checked-in. the Cus/olller's strongbox.
That is, the Provider claims that the strongbox is !:itil1 checked-out a.nd thus not in
the Provider's possession.

To dispute this claim the Customer can reveal the receipt tha.t he or she obtained
in Step CI-4. The receipt contains the signature of the Provider, which is taken to
mean that it currently holds the strongbox.
The failure to complete the check-in protocol (particularly that of Step CI-/l) can be
resolved by the Customer since the Customer still holds a copy of the strongbox.
Since the Provider will be unable to open the strongbox, this method is cheating
can only be detrimental to the reputation of the Provider.
Similar to the two cheating scenarios within the check-in protoml, two possible scenarios
exist for the check-out protocol:
• Provider denies check-out has occ1Lrred. Principally, this form of cheating is equivalent to a denial-of-service attack.

Although the Provider call abort the protocol between Step CO-3 and Step CO-·i,
thereby unfairly obtaining the Customer's proof of checking-out, in practise this
method of cheating can only be detrimental to the Provider. The Provider will
not find any use of the strongbox since it will not be able to decipher its contents.
Modifications to the protocol can be made ill order to ensure that occasions of this
method cheating is minimized .

• Cuslolna d£71ie.s performing t.he check-out. This method of cheating is more relevant
to the Provider since in this case the Cilstomer implicitly accuses the Provider of
stealing.
lIere the Provider can protect itself by f€vealing the receipt it obtained in Step CO-3,
which has been signed by the Customer.
aIle possible solution - with undesirable effects - is to repea.t Step CO-.:I. of the protocol in the presence of a Notary. This could lead to the Customer having duplicate
copies of the strongbox (awl therefore items). Such illegal duplications will later be
detected by other participil.nts of the strongbox system. In practice, the protocol
should atomic in the sense that no individual steps are allowed to be repeated.
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6. REMARKS AND CONCLUSION
There remains a number of issues related to the workability of the electronic strongbox
system:

• Duplicate items.
Similar to electronic cheques, electronic items within the strongbox ~ystem must be
prevented from being duplicated. In c1ectronic cheques, some method of llullIbering
(serial or random) of cheques are used together with blind-signatures to provide lIS<'1"
anonymity.
Within any system that employs numbering of objects (electronic cheques or items)
one requirement is that the "used" (old) object-numbers are stored in a database accessible to relevant parties. This \vould allow for the detection of uuplicated numbers
on items by searching through the database.
vVe perceive that the nature of strongboxes are Sllch that itt>m~ ar~ there to be
stored, with far less movement of items compared to tht> mon~ment of pl"r.tfOllic ca~h
or electronic cheques. Thus, the use of a secure database holding tll'_' identification
number of items is acceptable for the strongbox system. This database solution
depends: however: on the extent to which the strongbox system grO\\5. in v:hich case
other solutions may have to he found.

• Untracwbility.
Ideally electronic items should be untraceable \vhen they are mowr! (exchall?;eu)
between Customers. This is a natural expectation since the movement of phy~ir:al
items are also typically untraceable. :"Iethods such as blind-signatur<::5 can be used
ill a similar manner to that used for electronic cheques. However, additional research
must be conducted into methods to exchange items through the Exchange facilitator
(to ensure .fairness and honesty) in such a way that the Facilitator ll~\'er ~ees the
items being exchanged between two Customers. Other methods will be needed to
counter the possibility of linking electronic items to their current owners .

• Anonymity.
Anonymity of Customers i::; particularly important in the case of the exchange of
items, since exchanges typically im'olves the Exchange Facilitator acting as an arbiter. The use of pseudonyms within a smartcard-hased system offers a potential to
achieve Customer anonymity in the electronic strongbox system.
In this paper the issue of access to electronic strongboxes ha~ been discussed, together
with two protocols for the check-in and check-out of strongboxes. Allhough the protocols are still relatively simple, they point to the possible direction for the design and
implementation of electronic strongboxes as an integrated part of the electronic commerce

-infrastructure. Some security issues of the protocol have b~en discussed, concentrating on
the possibilities and effects of cheating. The current work represents further developmellts
in the effort to realize the electronic strongbox concept.
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